A new risk assessment scheme was developed to quantify the impact of resuspension to infection transmission indoors. Airborne and surface pathogenic particle concentration models including the effect of two major resuspension scenarios (airflow-induced particle resuspension [AIPR] and walking-induced particle resuspension [WIPR]) were derived based on two-compartment mass balance models and validated against experimental data found in the literature. The inhalation exposure to pathogenic particles was estimated using the derived airborne concentration model, and subsequently incorporated into a dose-response model to assess the infection risk. Using the proposed risk assessment scheme, the influences of resuspension towards indoor infection transmission were examined by two hypothetical case studies. In the case of AIPR, the infection risk increased from 0 to 0.54 during 0-0.5 hours and from 0.54 to 0.57 during 0.5-4 hours. In the case of WIPR, the infection risk increased from 0 to 0.87 during 0-0.5 hours and from 0.87 to 1 during 0.5-4 hours. Sensitivity analysis was conducted based on the design-of-experiments method and showed that the factors that are related to the inspiratory rate of viable pathogens and pathogen virulence have the most significant effect on the infection probability under the occurrence of AIPR and WIPR. The risk assessment scheme could serve as an effective tool for the risk assessment of infection transmission indoors. 
INTRODUCTION
Outbreaks of infectious disease have caused massive civilian casualties. Despite the significant improvement of modern medicine and living standards, some of these diseases continually impose great threat to the lives of human beings. For instance, there were an estimated 8.3 million new tuberculosis (TB) cases in 2000 (1) and more than 40,000 TB-related deaths annually in industrialized nations.
(2) Some emerging infectious diseases bring further threat to humans since the relevant control and management knowledge is generally lacking by the time they break out. A typical example is the outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) during 2002-2003, which caused great panic in the public because of the high fatality rate of the disease. (3) The anthrax letter incidents of 2001 in the United States raised an additional concern about the spread of infection by bioterrorist attacks. Bioterrorist attacks by the intentional release of aerosolized biological agents are characterized by their relatively low costs and technical challenges, the capability of causing injury and death in strange and prolonged ways, and their potential to inflict huge economic loss. (4) It was estimated that the postattack cost could be as high as $26.2 billion per 100,000 persons exposed to biological agents. (5) People spend most of their time (70%-90%) indoors; therefore, it is important to develop the capability to analyze human exposure to pathogens and thus infection risk for indoor environments. (6) Generally, there are three major infection transmission modes indoors, that is, droplet, airborne, and contact mode. (7, 8) Indoor surfaces serve as sinks for airborne pathogens because of deposition. However, some of these deposited pathogens could maintain their infectivity for extended periods (e.g., from several hours to months). (9) (10) (11) Once these deposited pathogens are resuspended from surfaces and become airborne again, they may be inhaled by occupants and impose a secondary infection risk. Previous studies (12) (13) (14) (15) suggested that pathogen resuspension can be a potential route for infection transmission. For example, Goebes et al. (15) found that walking over carpet could significantly increase the airborne concentration of Aspergillus and potentially result in invasive aspergillosis that could be fatal for immunocompromised people. Nazaroff (13) also indicated that the fomite on a heavily trafficked floor might become a secondary source of airborne pathogens because of human walking.
Risk assessment is commonly adopted to preclude infection and handle postepidemic or postattack situations. (16) A large number of studies have been done (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) to develop risk assessment models for infection transmission. However, very few of these studies (19, 24) explored the infection transmission route via pathogen resuspension. Resuspension rates (the amount of particles resuspended per unit time) were generally assumed to be constant in these analyses for simplicity, despite the fact that resuspension rates should vary with respect to time. (25) (26) (27) Hence, the capability of quantitatively characterizing the influence of pathogen resuspension toward infection transmission is still limited. This study aims to shed new insight into infection control and management based on risk assessment by proposing a new risk assessment scheme that quantifies the impact of resuspension to infection transmission indoors.
MODEL DEVELOPMENT

Identification of Resuspension Scenarios
Particle resuspension is governed by the interaction between detachment forces and adhesion forces. Depending on the source of detachment forces, there are airflow-induced particle resuspension (AIPR) and human-activity-induced particle resuspension (HAIPR), both of which are associated with human exposure to particles in the indoor environment.
Previous studies observed that the initiation friction velocity below which AIPR could not occur ranged from 0.1 to 0.3 m/s for particles of 1-34 μm (28) (29) (30) and the initiation friction velocity is generally larger for smaller particles. (31) The characteristic friction velocity in indoor environments ranges from 0.01 to 0.03 m/s (32) and the particles that are associated with human inhalation exposure are generally smaller than 10 μm, suggesting that AIPR in an indoor environment could hardly be a major contributing mechanism to particle inhalation exposure. In contrast, the characteristic friction velocity in ventilation air ducts is much higher (e.g., 0.7 m/s for a typical average airflow velocity of 9 m/s in the duct (33) ), indicating that AIPR in the ventilation air ducts is highly probable. Specifically, the particle resuspension in ventilation air ducts is relevant to ventilation-systemtargeted bioterrorist attacks where harmful agents could be deliberately dosed onto the duct floor when the ventilation system is off (usually at night, therefore more covert). Once the ventilation system is turned on again, some of these dosed agents could be resuspended and transported into the indoor environment, leading to mass contamination. (34) (35) (36) (37) The U.S. government warned that the ventilation systems of buildings are an ideal target for bioterrorism. (37) The AIPR in ventilation ducts could be considered by introducing the particle concentration dynamics model developed by You and Wan (38) into the two-compartment mass balance models of indoor particle dynamics. According to the study of You and Wan, (38) the particle concentration in the duct with the occurrence of AIPR without considering particle deposition in the duct is:
where N 0 is the surface number concentration of pathogens dosed onto the floor of duct, S v is the area of floor dosed with pathogens, and 2.83 × 10
is the ventilation rate in the duct. = r n1 t −r n2 is the normalized resuspension rate (the fraction of particles resuspended per unit time) for AIPR. The normalized resuspension rate ( ) could be calculated by the model from Loosmore: (26) (2) or that from Kim et al.: (25) d p u * = 8.521 × 10
where u * is the friction velocity, ρ p is the particle density, ρ a is the air density, A 132 = √ A 11 A 22 (A 11 and A 22 are the Hamaker constant of particle and surface, respectively) is the Hamaker constant, d p is the particle diameter, σ 1 is the surface roughness, and t is the time. When they are validated against different experiments, Equation (2) shows better match with experimental data than Equation (3) in some datasets, whereas Equation (3) outperforms Equation (2) in some others. There is still no definite conclusion about which model, Equation (2) or (3), is more accurate. After plugging in the casespecific parameters (Table II for this study), both Equations (2) and (3) will arrive at a power law form of = k 1 t k 2 , where k 1 is the coefficient and k 2 is the exponent. The final form for in this study is obtained by taking the average of coefficients and exponents from Equations (2) and (3). The final form of used in this study is shown in Table III. A variety of human activities could resuspend particles indoors, such as walking, vacuuming, and bed folding. Among these activities, walking (i.e., walking-induced particle resuspension [WIPR] ) is one of the most common ones capable of causing significant particle resuspension. (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) The field measurement of Weis et al. (44) following the 2001 anthrax attack in the United States suggested that the WIPR could serve as one of secondary pathogen sources for human exposure. WIPR is considered by this work as another resuspension scenario. It has been shown that the variation of resuspension rate with respect to time for WIPR could be reasonably described by a power law function: (45) 
where a r depends on the factors such as walking strength, particle surface loading, relative humidity (RH), resuspension area, and flooring material. (45) (46) (47) The AIPR-and WIPR-related airborne particle concentration models have been developed by You and Wan (38, 45) based on a one-compartment mass balance model. In Section 2.2, two-compartment mass balance models will be employed to develop both airborne and surface particle concentration models with the occurrence of both AIPR and WIPR, which serve as the basis for the exposure analysis of Section 2.3 and risk assessment of Section 2.4.
Airborne and Surface Particle Concentration Models
Two-Compartment Mass Balance Model
Indoor particle concentration profiles could be modeled by two-compartment mass balance models under the well-mixed assumption. The well-mixed assumption has been widely adopted for modeling indoor particle concentration variation. (46, (48) (49) (50) The two-compartment mass balance models are:
2 ). Equations (5) and (6) account for the air and surface compartments, respectively. C i (#/m 3 ) and C o (#/m 3 ) are the indoor and outdoor airborne particle concentrations, respectively. C ov (#/m 3 ) is the airborne particle concentration in the ventilation duct due to the AIPR inside (Equation (1)). M (#/m 2 ) is the indoor particle concentration on the surface where resuspension occurs. V (m 3 ) is the volume of indoor space. R (#/s) is the resuspension rate of WIPR. v df (m/s) is the particle deposition velocity onto the floor. S r (m 2 ) is the particle resuspension area. E (#/s) is the indoor emission sources (e.g., expiratory activities) besides WIPR. a 1 (s −1 ) is the entrance rate of outdoor particles. a 2 (s −1 ) is the entrance rate of resuspended particles from the ventilation duct. b (s −1 ) is the loss rate of indoor particles. a 1 , a 2 , and b are ventilation system dependent (i.e., mechanical ventilation and natural ventilation).
In the case of mechanical ventilation ( Fig. 1(a) ),
is the air exchange rate. R r is the fraction of recirculated air from the exiting air. η r is the removal efficiency of the filter in the ventilation duct, which depends on the particle size and the type of filter. η r can be obtained from the study of Riley et al. (51) for some commonly used commercial filters such as 40% and 85% ASHRAE filters. p b1 is the aerosol penetration through bends in the ventilation duct for outdoor particles and could be estimated according to the theory of McFarland et al. (52) d v1 is the parameter accounting for the effect of particle deposition in the ventilation duct and is calculated
(1−Rr )Qs
. v dfv , v dwv , and v dcv are the deposition velocities of particles onto the floor, wall, and ceiling of the ventilation duct, respectively, which could be estimated based on the study by Sippola and Nazaroff.
(33) P f , P w , and P c are the width of floor, wall, and ceiling of ventilation duct, respectively. x v1 is the ventilation duct length passed by outdoor particles.
is the aerosol penetration through bends for resuspended particles in the ventilation duct.
x v2 is the ventilation duct length passed by the resuspended particles in the ventilation duct.
, and v dc (m/s) are the particle deposition velocities onto the indoor floor, wall, and ceiling, respectively, and can be estimated based on the existing model (32) or experimental data.
, and A c (m 2 ) are the areas of indoor floor, wall, and ceiling, respectively. β b (m 3 /s) is the breathing rate of the occupant. The deposition efficiency of pathogen in human respiratory tract varies from 0.2 to 1 according to the size of the pathogen. In this study, the aerodynamic diameter of Bacillus anthracis (considered pathogen) is assumed ‫‬ to be 3 μm. The corresponding deposition efficiency is above 0.9. (54) For simplicity of subsequent analysis, it is assumed to be 1. For other pathogens that have a much lower deposition efficiency, the term
should be multiplied by the deposition efficiency in the equation of the loss rate (b) to account for the corresponding effect. n p is the number of
Rr Qs accounts for the deposition of particles in the recirculated air. x v3 is the duct length passed by the recirculated air. p b3 is the aerosol penetration through bends in the ventilation duct for the particles in the recirculated air.
In the case of natural ventilation ( Fig. 1(b) ), a 1 = p c α a . p c is the penetration coefficient ranging from 0 to 1 depending on the factors such as particle size and building conditions. The penetration coefficient could be estimated based on existing size-resolved experimental data. (48, (55) (56) (57) a 2 = 0, that is, AIPR from the ventilation duct, does not exist in the case of nat-
. In Equations (5) and (6), particle coagulation and condensation are not considered. Wherever the effect of coagulation or condensation becomes significant (e.g., extremely high airborne particle concentration such as more than 1 × 10 10 #/m 3(58) ), the model needs to be modified to account for the corresponding effect. In Equations (5) and (6), the parameters are corresponding to the particles within a certain size bin, which allows the particle size distribution to be considered implicitly. For example, if there are different particle size classes, each class of particles will have its own set of mass balance models and the combination of all sets of mass balance models will describe the particle dynamics of all these particles.
To solve Equations (5) and (6), the information about the dynamics of outdoor concentration (C o ) and other emission sources (E) is needed. The outdoor concentration is assumed to be zero because most of pathogens could not survive for a long period of time outdoors because of the germicidal effect of sunlight. (59) For other indoor emission sources such as expiratory activities and aerosolization of harmful pathogens during a bioterrorist attack, the emission dynamics is controlled by the particle producing process. The emission rate, E (the number or mass of particles emitted per unit time) of these sources is assumed to be constant (i.e., E = D) during the period of emission, which has also been adopted by existing studies. (23, (60) (61) (62) 
Airborne and Surface Particle
Concentration Models
Q s t r n2 , R(t) = a r t −b r , and E = D into Equation (5) yields:
Substituting R(t) = a r t −b r into Equation (6) yields:
Let
= a 2 ; Equation (7) becomes:
The indoor airborne particle concentration is obtained by solving Equation (9) as:
. (10) Putting Equation (10) back into Equation (8) and integrating with respect to time from 0 to t gives the surface particle concentration:
Applying the theorem of integration by parts to the fourth and fifth terms on the right-hand side of Equation (11) yields:
The effect of each source on the variation of airborne and surface concentrations could be identified based on the derived models (Equations (10) and (12)). For example, the airborne concentration model (Equation (10)) consists of four terms. The first term accounts for the effect of initial indoor airborne concentration. The second and third terms account for the effect of AIPR in the ventilation duct and WIPR indoors, respectively. The fourth term accounts for the effect of other indoor emission sources. The indoor particle loss mechanisms (e.g., deposition and ventilation) denoted by b affect all four terms in an exponential way. The airborne concentration is resultant from the superposition of initial concentration, AIPR, WIPR, and other indoor emission sources under the effect of these loss mechanisms. The contribution of AIPR and WIPR toward indoor airborne and surface concentrations under a certain ventilation, building, and occupancy conditions could be identified based on the above models.
Exposure Analysis
Because inhalation infection risk is generally the main component of overall infection risk (19) and is the major risk associated with resuspension, only inhalation exposure is considered here. The inhalation exposure during a period of T e can be calculated as:
where p fs is the fraction of pathogens survived after a certain period of time, which can be estimated by p fs = e −γ d t with γ d as the decay rate of pathogen. (63) p fi = 1 − 0.15[log 10 (1 + d ae )] 2 − 0.10log 10 (1 + d ae ) is the inhalability parameter, where d ae is the aerodynamic diameter of pathogens. (64) For the pathogen concerned in this study (B. anthracis), which has an aerodynamic diameter of 3 μm, the inhalability parameter is very close to 1.
To estimate the inhalation exposure, the airborne concentration model (Equation (10)) is substituted into the integral of Equation (13),
and thus the exposure estimation is:
It should be noted that in the case without WIPR,
, and thus:
This means that the inhalation exposure is directly proportional to the pathogen surface concentration in the case without WIPR. Hence, the exposure estimation can be performed based on surface concentration sampling in the case without WIPR, which is of practical significance for postepidemic or postattack responses.
Infection Probability Analysis
The infection probability after exposure to a certain amount of pathogens could be estimated by the exponential dose-response model: (19, 61, 65) 
where r i is the fitting parameter accounting for the infectivity of pathogen and the pathogen-host interactions. I is the human exposure to pathogens. The influences of various factors (e.g., pathogen persistence, deposition loss of pathogen, and pathogen resuspension) on infection transmission modify the magnitude of human exposure, which changes the input in the dose-response model to give different infection probabilities. Hence, the role of resuspension in infection transmission could be determined by incorporating the exposure estimation (Equation (15)) into the dose-response model and will be examined by the case studies in Section 4.
PHYSICAL VALIDATION
The infection-probability-based model validation is impossible for the time being because of the lacking of relevant data. Alternatively, physical validation is conducted by comparing model predictions of airborne particle concentrations to experimental data (66) (WIPR involved) found in the literature. The validation of AIPR in the ventilation duct is not conducted due to the lacking of experimental data and is left for a future task.
The study of Qian and Ferro (66) measured the variation of airborne particle (0.4-10 μm) concentrations in a full-scaled chamber where a participant performed prescribed activities on a seeded carpet. The participant first walked on the carpet for five minutes, followed by sitting for 20 minutes, and then walked for five minutes again followed by leaving the chamber. The airborne concentration profiles for 2-3 μm and 4-5 μm particles were selected for validation. A HEPA filter was installed upon the chamber ventilation and the outdoor airborne particles did not enter the chamber during the measurements. The test dust was seeded onto the carpet to a mass concentration of 20 g/m 2 based on which the number concentrations of 2-3 μm and 4-5 μm particles can be estimated based on the size distribution of test dust and the particle density (2650 kg/m 3 ). To determine the resuspension rate for the WIPR, the resuspension rate [R (t) = 2.25t −0.58 ] of the carpet/PM 10 case at the walking rate of 132 steps/min under the RH of 82% in the study of You and Wan (45) is used as the reference. In the reference case, the resuspension area is 0.2 m 2 and the surface mass concentration is 1.75 g/m 2 . The power law coefficient (a r ) of resuspension rate is proportional to the resuspension area and particle surface concentration. Based on the study of You and Wan, (45) the normalized resuspension rate under the RH of 31.7% is assumed to be 5-6 times of that under the RH of 82%. The normalized resuspension rate of PM 10 was about 2.5 times of PM 2.5 and resuspension is more significant for larger particles. (45) It is assumed that the normalized resuspension rates for the cases of 2-3 μm and 4-5 μm particles are (0.4-0.6) and (0.8-1.0) times that of PM 10 , respectively. Hence, the power law coefficient of resuspension rate for 2-3 μm particles is estimated to range from −0.58 in the unit of μg/s. In view that measured airborne concentration was in the unit of #/m 3 , the resuspension rate is further divided by the mass of a single particle (m p ) to convert the unit of μg/s to #/s. Hence, the resuspension rates in the unit of #/s vary from R(t) = 9.2 × 10 6 t −0.58 (lower resuspension rate) to R(t) = 1.7 × 10 7 t −0.58 (upper resuspension rate) and from R(t) = 4.8 × 10 6 t −0.58 (lower resuspension rate) to R(t) = 7.3 × 10 6 t −0.58 (upper resuspension rate) for 2-3 μm and 4-5 μm particles, respectively. The parameters required for modeling are listed in Table I . The comparison between experimental data and model predictions is given by Fig. 2 . The model predictions are based on the lower and upper resuspension rates, respectively, to account for the uncertainty of resuspension rate estimation.
It is shown that the model predictions based on lower and upper resuspension rate well cover the experimental data and capture the variation of airborne concentrations with respect to time; that is, the concentration quickly increases during the walking period because of the overwhelming effect of WIPR and declines during the nonwalking period because of the particle loss mechanisms (e.g., deposition and ventilation). The increase of airborne concentration for 2.5 μm particles is larger than that for 4.5 μm particles because of the fact that the initial surface concentration is larger for 2.5 μm particles. This is also reflected in Table I where 2.5 μm particles have larger resuspension rates than 4.5 μm particles. The predicting capability of the derived models for the case with WIPR is reasonably validated.
CASE STUDIES
The impact of resuspension on infection transmission was examined by two hypothetical case studies on bioterrorist attacks. In case 1 (AIPR case), pathogens were dosed onto the floor of a ventilation duct when the ventilation was off, and some of them were resuspended and transported into the indoor environment when the ventilation system was running again. In case 2 (WIPR case), pathogens were deposited onto an indoor floor and some of them were resuspended due to human walking. B.
anthracis was applied as the representative pathogen, which has the approximate size of 1 μm × 5 μm (67) in a rod shape corresponding to the aerodynamic diameter of 3 μm. (68) Although there are inhalational anthrax, cutaneous anthrax, and gastrointestinal anthrax in terms of exposure pathways, the inhalational anthrax is the most life-threatening one with a mortality rate as high as 90-99% if untreated. (69) This reinforces the importance of inhalation exposure analysis for B. anthracis.
Case 1-AIPR Case
Ten grams of B. anthracis spores were dosed onto the duct floor when the ventilation was off. It was assumed that a monolayer of spores was formed on the floor of the ventilation duct and the phenomena of clumping and aggregation that commonly occur for multiple deposits were neglected. Therefore, all deposited pathogen would be exposed to airflow when the ventilation was on and the results might represent an upper limit prediction for the considered bioterrorist attack case. The setting of parameters about the ventilation system, room geometry, and occupancy was similar to the study of You and Wan. (38) The initial indoor airborne and surface pathogen concentrations were zero. There were three occupants with a breathing rate of 2.83 × 10 −4 m 3 /s each. (59) The fraction of recirculated air, R r , was 0.8. (33) The ventilation duct was made of plastic and had the cross-sectional dimension of 0.25 m (W) × 0.25 m (H). (33) The air exchange rate was 5 h −1 , corresponding to the flow rate of 800 m 3 /h in the ventilation duct. (70) The friction velocity was estimated to be 0.247 m/s, according to the relationship between the friction velocity and free stream velocity in the study of You and Wan. (38) It was assumed that both dosed agents and recirculated agents would go through five bends before they entered indoors. The penetration coefficient of a bend ( p b ) was approximately 100% for the considered airflow condition and size of agent. (52) The duct lengths from both the agent dosing location and the air outlet to the air supply intake were assumed to be 20 m. An ASHARE 40% filter of the efficiency of 0.8 (51) for 3 μm particles (the average size for anthrax) was installed in the ventilation system. The parameters needed for calculating the normalized resuspension rate ( ) and infection probability are listed in Tables II and  III , respectively. The variation of airborne and surface pathogen concentrations and infection probability during a 4-h period for case 1 is shown by Fig. 3 . A 132 Hamaker constant J 7.12 × 10 −20a (25) u * Friction velocity m/s 0.247 (38) ρ p Particle density kg/m 3 1,200 (34) ρ a Air density kg/m 3 1.2 (68) σ 1 Surface roughness μm 5 (34) a A 132 = √ A 11 A 22 , where A 11 = 6.5 × 10 −20 J and A 22 = 7.8 × 10 −20 J are the Hamaker constant of particle and surface, respectively. (25) In case 1, the airborne pathogen concentration increases to the peak level of 4.95 × 10 5 #/m 3 at about 18 seconds and then declines quickly for up to about 7,200 seconds (2 hours) followed by a very slow decrease afterward. The airborne pathogen concentration only decreases by one-half (from 1800 #/m 3 to 900 #/m 3 ) for the period of 7,200-14,400 seconds (2-4 hours) compared to about two orders of magnitude for the period of 16-7,200 seconds (0.005-2 hours). This is because of the fact that the normalized resuspension rate of AIPR and time exhibits a power law decay correlation. The surface pathogen concentration increases all the way through 14,400 seconds (4 hours) because of the effect of deposition. The surface concentration increases very quickly before 1,800 seconds (0.5 hours) followed by a slow increase corresponding to the small airborne concentration then. The infection probability increases fast (from 0 to 0.54) during the first 1,800 seconds (0.5 hours) and increases relatively slowly (from 0.54 to 0.57) afterward. This suggests the importance of early evacuation action against a bioterrorist attack. The variation pattern of infection probability (Fig. 3(b) ) is similar to that of surface concentration because human exposure to pathogens is directly related to the surface concentration in the case without WIPR as shown by Equation (16).
Case 2-WIPR Case
Ten grams of B. anthracis spores were deposited onto the floor of a mechanically ventilated room with carpet flooring. The corresponding initial surface pathogen concentration M(0) was 4.61 × 10 9 #/m 2 . The initial airborne pathogen concentration was zero. There were three occupants and it was assumed that there was averagely one occupant (19) b The data are from Krauter and Biermann. (34) Fig . 3 . Modeling results for case 1: the variation of (a) airborne and surface pathogen concentrations and (b) infection probability.
walking at the medium rate (e.g., 108 steps/min) during a 4-h period. The indoor RH was 40%. The resuspension area was assumed to be 20% of the total flooring area. Based on the carpet/PM 10 case at the waking rate of 108 steps/min and the RH of 82% in the study of You and Wan, (45) the resuspension rate of the WIPR was approximated to be R(t) = 61.07t Table III . Most of the parameters in this case had the same value as those used for case 1 except that: (1) the initial surface concentration is zero for case 1 whereas it is a finite value for case 2; (2) the normalized resuspension rate of AIPR is considered in case 1, whereas the resuspension rate of WIPR is considered in case 2. The modeling results are shown in Fig. 4 . showing the depletion effect of walking on the pathogens on the floor. The infection probability increases dramatically (from 0 to 0.87) during the first 1,800 seconds (0.5 hours) followed by a much slower increase afterward, suggesting that early identification of the bioterrorist attack and evacuation of occupants are critical for effectively mitigating an attack. After a 2-hour exposure, the infection probability is nearly 1, showing the capability of the WIPR to cause high infection risk.
Similar peak concentrations (4.95 × 10 5 #/m 3 vs. 5.7 × 10 5 #/m 3 ) are resultant for case 1 and case 2. However, the airborne concentration for case 2 reaches the peak later than case 1 (400 seconds vs. 18 seconds), and the airborne concentration in case 2 is significantly larger than that in case 1 (1.50 × 10 5 #/m 3 vs. 1,800 #/m 3 ) after 2 hours. This suggests the stronger capability of maintaining airborne pathogen concentration for the case with WIPR (case 2). Correspondingly, the infection probability of case 2 is higher than that of case 1 for a 4-hour exposure (1 vs. 0.57).
It should be noted that although two major resuspension scenarios (i.e., AIPR in the ventilation duct and WIPR indoors) are considered here, the proposed scheme could be easily extended to consider other resuspension processes (e.g., vacuum-cleaning-induced resuspension) by simply moderating the resuspension rate parameter in the concentration models (Equations (10) and (12)). Moreover, the proposed risk assessment scheme is also appropriate for the cases where no resuspension is involved, despite the impact of resuspension is specifically examined in this work. Hence, the risk assessment scheme could serve as an effective tool for the risk assessment of infection transmission indoors.
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
Sensitivity analysis was conducted by examining the effect of various factors on the infection probability based on the design-of-experiments (DOE) method with a 2 5 factorial design. (71) According to the airborne concentration model (Equation (10)), exposure model (Equation (15)), and dose-response model (Equation (17)), five factors including A = a 2 , B = b, C = a r /V, D = β b p fi p fs , and E = r i were considered. A combination of these factors covers all the parameters affecting infection probability. The factor A accounts for the effect of AIPR in the ventilation duct together with ventilation parameters (i.e., ventilation rate, filter efficiency, etc.). The factor B accounts for the effect of particle loss rate indoors. The factor C accounts for the effect of WIPR indoors. The fact or D accounts for the effect of the inspiratory rate of viable pathogens. The factor E accounts for the effect of the virulence coefficient of pathogen. In the factorial design, the effect of the factors on the infection probability P i (600 seconds exposure) was examined and the low and high levels of the factors are ±20% of nominal values (i. 
where ± corresponds to the (+/−) signs of each main effect and interaction for each response obtained from Table IV . The significance of the factors and their interactions on the response is analyzed by constructing a normal probability plot of the main effects and interactions as shown by Fig. 5 . If a factor or an interaction has insignificant effect on the infection probability, it will behave like a small random error and will be normally distributed, as indicated by the straight line, whereas if a factor or an interaction has significant effect on the infection probability, it will deviate away from the line. (71) If a factor or an interaction is further away from the straight line, its effect will be more significant and the response will be more sensitive to it.
It is shown by Fig. 5 that the most significant effect is the main effects of D (14.12%) and E (14.12%), followed by the main effects of B (−7.17%), C (7.07%), and A (6.92%) (the negative sign means an inverse relationship). This means that the infection probability is the most sensitive to the factors associated with the inspiration of viable pathogens (D) and pathogen virulence (E). The effect of the factors related to AIPR (A) in the duct and WIPR (C) indoors is comparable to the factor related to indoor particle loss mechanisms (B), all of which play a moderate role in the infection probability. This suggests that the infection control measures that are designed to reduce the inspiratory rate of viable pathogens (e.g., wearing mask and applying detergent to clean pathogen laden surfaces to reduce the number of viable pathogens on surfaces) and pathogen virulence (e.g., vaccines) (72) are the most effective, followed by the measures to increase the loss of airborne particle concentrations (e.g., increasing ventilation rate), (73) under the occurrence of AIPR or WIPR or both. The interactions of the factors have negligible effects compared to the main effects, as they well overlap with the straight line.
CONCLUSIONS
A new risk assessment scheme was developed to quantitatively explore the role of resuspension in indoor infection transmission. Two major resuspension scenarios (i.e., AIPR in ventilation ducts and WIPR indoors) were considered and a set of airborne and surface particle concentration models were derived based on the two-compartment mass balance models. Physical validation was conducted by comparing modeled airborne particle concentrations to the existing data found in the literature and a good agreement was found. The inhalation exposure analysis was conducted based on the derived airborne concentration model, which was subsequently incorporated into the dose-response model to assess the infection probability. Using the proposed risk assessment scheme, the impact of resuspension to indoor infection transmission was examined by studying two hypothetical cases on bioterrorist attacks. Sensitivity analysis based on the DOE method showed that the factors that are related to the inspiratory rate of viable pathogens and pathogen virulence have the most significant effect on the infection probability, under the occurrence of AIPR and WIPR. The risk assessment scheme could serve as an effective tool for the risk assessment of an infection outbreak or a bioterrorist attack.
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